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RONCO is an international professional services firm that provides
public and private sector clients with advisory, training, implementation,
and management assistance. Founded in 1974, the firm has worked in
developing countries on over 300 development projects. RONCO has
been involved extensively in humanitarian demining for over ten years
and has no relationship of any kind with the ordnance manufacturing
industry or its distributors. The company's business is sustainable
development.

Afghanistan–The Beginning Years: 19891994
Under a US Agency for International Development (USAID) contract,
RONCO provided commodity procurement, technical assistance, as well
as logistics services and training to the Afghan resistance then fighting
the Soviet Army. Under this contract, RONCO first introduced the
concept of using dogs for mine detection as part of a durable, affordable,
indigenous institutional capacity to manage demining. Capitalizing on
prior US Army involvement in creating a mine dog capacity within a
Royal Thai Army unit operating on the heavily mined Cambodian
border, contacts were made with the Government of Thailand to arrange
for 14 demining dogs and Thai Army handlers to train Afghans in
demining techniques. This was done under RONCO auspices in
resistancecontrolled areas.
With less than a oneyear pilot, two years of operations, and a oneyear
transition period, the Afghan Mine Dog Detection Center (AMDDC) was
created by RONCO as a fully independent Afghan nongovernment
organization (NGO). Once the NGO was fully operational, US
Government (USG) funding ceased and the United Nations (UN)
assumed sponsorship in 1994. By the time of the handover, 36,000 anti
tank mines, antipersonnel mines, and other ordnance had been detected
and destroyed. As reported by the UN, these numbers accounted for one
fourth of all mines destroyed worldwide at the time. Furthermore, no
casualties were sustained in demining activities throughout the
company's involvement in Afghanistan. RONCO trained dogs and
handlers to continue to clear mines in Afghanistan under AMDDC

auspices and UN and German stewardship.
The sustainable local capacity built for the Afghans has served not only
as a prototype for subsequent demining efforts elsewhere but also as a
wellstone of policy and operational lessons that have been refined over
the years.

Putting the Afghanistan Experience to Work
Mozambique
RONCO began another USAIDsponsored effort in Mozambique in
November 1993. The Afghanbased approaches proved highly effective.
RONCO trained 90 Mozambican deminers, 32 dog handlers, and an
equal number of dogs. They all formed 12 separate teams. The effort
quickly cleared over 2,000 km of roadways, making it possible to
reconnect nearly one million people to their local economies in the
Sofala, Manica, Zambezia, and Tete Provinces.
Angola
Under a subcontract to a South African firm, RONCO's "free running"
dogs cleared and certified as safe over 3,000 km of road. Some 4,000 km
were surveyed and certified safe. The dogs provided quality assurance
for all the roadways by pinpointing the location of the mines previously
sensed by capital intensive mechanical means.
Rwanda
Under Department of Defense and USAID funding, RONCO began in
October 1995 with US Special Operations Forces to develop a Rwandan
capacity to manage, supervise, and support on a longterm basis a fully
independent entity for humanitarian demining. Work is still underway
with 24 highly trained dogs and handlers working in tandem with
deminers.
Bosnia
A contract was signed in March 1996 with the Department of State to
build local capacity to identify and remove mines placed along the
confrontation lines. A Mine Action Center has been created and staffed
with trained local personnel. A computerized geographic information
system has been established. An awareness program was created and
information disseminated. Three regional centers were developed in
Muslim, Serb, and Croat areas where locally recruited personnel were
trained to operate with RONCO demining dogs. Through 89 discrete

demining tasks, transportation has resumed; refugees have returned to
areas where political and security circumstances have permitted; and a
semblance of normalcy has been created. Demining activities continue,
and RONCO has entered into business partnerships with demining
companies it created under the initial contracts.

Some Operational Lessons
Affordable, Sustainable Local Capacity
RONCO has undertaken a few highly discrete demining contracts of 3 to
5 months duration. Without exception, each activity has engendered a
followon contract. Unfortunately, these scarce resources were not all
used to the maximum extent due to repeated mobilization and
demobilization costs. Some duplicative expenses could have been
avoided with a modification of the operational concept: the development
of affordable and sustainable local capacity rather than the numbers of
mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) detected and square meters or
miles cleared generally required by the short term arrangements.
Capital Costs
RONCO has been involved in research and development of new
landmine detection and clearance technologies and remains committed to
the use of the best and safest available methods. Yet the company
believes that, at the present time, the exclusive use of relatively
expensive, capitalintensive methods has only limited application to
many, if not most, humanitarian demining scenarios. Moreover, the costs
are frequently such that the host country cannot afford to purchase and
operate the equipment on a sustainable basis. The combination of dogs
and locally trained handlers and deminers with appropriately tailored
equipment offers the best combination of inputs to create a "technology"
that works. This approach allows a relatively low frontend investment
and an acceptable recurrent cost burden on local authorities. The latter
point is especially critical after external financing dissipates and the
mining threat continues to command the attention and resources of the
host country.
Technology that Works
Minedetecting dogs have a sense of smell that is at least 1,000 times
more sensitive than humans. Dogs can be trained to detect the scent of
explosives and their containers (metal or plastic) embedded beneath the
earth. Thus, dogs add an important safety factor to nearly any demining
activity because they can detect the odor of nonmetallic or plastic
encased, deeply embedded mines as well as those found on steel
reinforced bridges or railroad tracks, where metal detectors are

essentially useless. In 1995, the US military conducted a field test of 30
discrete demining technologies. RONCO demining dogs were described
by test authorities as follows: "At the top of the list, in terms of finding
mines and trip wires, are dogs. They detected every trip wire set and
discovered more mines than any other system." Demining dogs are able
to prove negative areas quickly and offer an extremely high level of
quality assurance.
Setting, Timing, and Sequencing of Resource Allocations
Depending on the threat level, landmine issues can significantly and
negatively influence the ability to initiate development projects in
previously contested areas. Yet, depending on the nature of the local and
international entities involved (highly politicized, neutral, commercially
driven, idealistic, or a combination), humanitarian demining has not
always been afforded an appropriate priority level. While difficult to
attain, demining resources should be allocated commensurate with the
threat in populated or vacated areas that are to be repopulated soon.
Where significant population movements are concerned, a participatory
approach involving local leaders should be used. In making resource
allocations, timing and sequencing of all humanitarian activities should
be considered at the outset. In other words, education activities should
not be funded in areas that cannot be repopulated due to an overriding
mine threat. Conversely, demining should not be financed in sparsely
populated areas when there is a telling health issue elsewhere.
Division of Labor
Host countries, international organizations, bilateral governments,
NGOs, quasiNGOs, and commercial firms alike are all working on
demining. Some work in concert, but others are clearly at odds. When
international efforts are viewed as a whole, there appears to be not nearly
enough consistency between approaches and methods taken in similar
settings by different players. In any event, shortterm, highcost walk
away programs should be avoided, especially those that leave no legacy
of strengthened local institutions.

Some Policy Lessons
Need for a Generally Agreedupon Road Map
To RONCO's knowledge, no road map or generally agreedupon
humanitarian demining strategy exists within the international
community. Such a road map would synthesize
an agreement on the extent of the worldwide problem,

cost effective and sustainable operational programs,
known and proven technologies,
lessons learned from ongoing operations,
the most promising research and development efforts,
the best practices for mine awareness programs, and
preferred victim assistance interventions into a cohesive and
defensible strategy. More to the point, newly undertaken
humanitarian demining activities sometimes include response
mechanisms that appear more keyed to political perceptions than
proven field realities.
Focussed International Efforts
While there is room for improvement and renewed efforts by all players,
greater consistency and coherence in design and approach are needed by
international organizations such as the World Bank, UN, OAS, ADB, and
others. Bilateral government programs can be quite influential in this
arena, but they also need coherent and consistent approaches.
Standardized and Integrated MIS
While there are many humanitarian demining information systems, few
are complimentary or even compatible, and not all are credible.
Important data fields in those systems are being questioned by political
entities and deminers alike–for example, the numbers of mines in
specific countries. Lack of compatibility and credibility makes it difficult
to mature the policy process. This is especially critical for developing
widely agreedupon measures of effectiveness. The focal point should be
economic wellbeing and quality of life indicators. In short, measurement
of positive beneficiary impact should be the primary gauge of successful
humanitarian demining operations.

